The instabilities of expertise: remaking knowledge, power and politics in unsettled times by Newman, Janet & Clarke, John
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ciej20
Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science
Research
ISSN: 1351-1610 (Print) 1469-8412 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ciej20
The instabilities of expertise: remaking knowledge,
power and politics in unsettled times
Janet Newman & John Clarke
To cite this article: Janet Newman & John Clarke (2018) The instabilities of expertise: remaking
knowledge, power and politics in unsettled times, Innovation: The European Journal of Social
Science Research, 31:1, 40-54, DOI: 10.1080/13511610.2017.1396887
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/13511610.2017.1396887
Published online: 01 Nov 2017.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 130
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The instabilities of expertise: remaking knowledge, power and politics
in unsettled times
Janet Newman and John Clarke *
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, The Open University, Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA,
UK
(Received 14 June 2017; ﬁnal version received 23 October 2017)
In this article, we explore the implications of contemporary populist challenges to
established forms of expertise in the UK, USA and elsewhere. Drawing on a
Foucauldian conception of knowledge and power as always articulated, we argue for
a conjunctural approach to understanding the ways in which formations of expertise
become stabilized and de-stabilized, vulnerable to challenge and contestation. We
trace the role of economic expertise in deﬁning the limits of political and policy
“realism” before and after the crash of 2007–8. We then consider the rise of
nationalist-populist political mobilizations which challenged existing “expertise” in
the name of popular wisdom. In the context of de-stabilized forms of expertise, we
ask about emergent attempts at reconﬁguring knowledge, power and politics in
different ways.
Keywords: expertise; power; knowledge; conjuncture; populism; austerity; articulation
In this paper we challenge the idea of expertise as formed of distinct and coherent sets of
knowledges, capacities and skills. Rather we view it as a condensate in which particular
formations of knowledge and power are conﬁgured. Further, we explore the complex
and shifting relationships between this conception of expertise and the ﬁeld of politics.
Drawing on the recent trajectory of the United Kingdom (UK), though with references
to other settings, we trace the dominance of particular modes of expertise – articulated
around the economy – as central to the construction of the policy and politics of austerity.
We then consider contestations of this dominant framing, in particular the outbreaks of
populist disaffection visible in the UK, parts of Europe and North America. Such mobil-
izations seek to install understandings of “the people” as a collective moral subject, creat-
ing a politics played out through differently articulated claims to authority. These populist
challenges have identiﬁed “experts” as the embodiment of elite power and domination, to
be challenged in the name of popular sentiment and wisdom. We argue that this points to
the value of a conjunctural understanding of expertise. In this, we draw on a form of analy-
sis developed in cultural studies that treats speciﬁc forms of expertise as articulated for-
mations active – both activated and activating – in particular conﬁgurations of time–
space. Such formations move between moments of stabilization as the dominant modes
of knowing and instability as they become vulnerable to challenge and contestation
(see, inter alia, Clarke 2010a; Clarke and Newman 2017; Grossberg 2010; Hall and
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Massey 2010). We show how conﬁgurations of knowledge and power are always contin-
gent and contested, producing conditions of instability. We consider to what extent chal-
lenges to established expertise displace them, and ask whether there are emergent
formations that might constitute new alignments of knowledge, power and politics.
This paper works with a Foucauldian view of knowledge as always entangled with
power, rather than a conception of expertise as a free-ﬂoating cluster of knowledge,
capacities and skills. Foucault insisted that knowledge is never separate from the dynamics
of power, and never able to transcend the social formations in which it is active. In Disci-
pline and Punish, he argued that: “There is no power relation without the correlative con-
stitution of a ﬁeld of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and
constitute at the same time power relations” (1991, 27). This provides a foundation for
critical work on forms of expertise and here we take up its promise for thinking about
the current political conjuncture in which economic expertise has occupied a central role
–most evidently providing the legitimating rationale for the politics and policies of auster-
ity. However, as we show, since 2008 the power-knowledge nexus of economic expertise
has been characterized by a series of instabilities and contestations that predated the current
eruptions of populist styles of politics. To this Foucauldian conception of power/knowl-
edge, we add our conjunctural view of formations of expertise, recognizing that such for-
mations are always particular to speciﬁc moments of time–space, rather than being
universal in either dimension (Clarke forthcoming a). Such formations are constructed,
acquire their legitimacy, and become institutionalized in assemblages of agents, practices,
and technologies. But their claims to universality – to being viewed as natural or normal –
also come to be challenged or contested at particular times and in particular places. One
such moment was the populist challenge to the seemingly hegemonic power of the econ-
omic expertise in the period of austerity governance in the UK.
Conﬁguring knowledge and power: the expertise of austerity
Since the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–8, the governmental space of the EU has been dominated
by austerity policies, marking the triumphant recovery of neoliberal economic expertise
from brief challenges to its legitimacy (see, inter alia, Davies 2016; Evans and McBride
forthcoming; Forkert 2017; Varoufakis 2016). Economics, economists and economic
expertise-centred institutions (from credit ratings agencies to the International Monetary
Fund) had failed to anticipate the crisis of the ﬁnancial sector and its global effects.
This produced a brief moment in which political denunciations of capitalism appeared.
But “austerity”, rather than challenging conventional economic wisdom, marked its
return: national governments and supra-national institutions insisted that a crisis of
public debt, largely engendered by “bailing out” failing ﬁnancial institutions, required
tough measures to restore ﬁnancial and ﬁscal conﬁdence. Like many others, we view
this neoliberal dominance of the “economic” as a distinctive formation of knowledge
and power; other versions of economic expertise, for example those that acknowledged
questions of care, environmental harm or the costs of inequality, were subordinated or
erased. It was a stripped down form of economics – one readily aligned with austerity
as a political project – that became institutionalized in diverse apparatuses, from think
tanks to popular media (see, inter alia, Brown 2015; Davies 2016; Mirowski and
Plehwe 2009; Peck 2010).
Establishing this space of “the economic” creates the conditions for things called
“economies” to be imagined in ways that subordinated of the ﬁeld of “the social” to the
economy’s projected needs, logics and dynamics. Appeals to economic necessity were
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combined with claims about moral virtue, presenting austerity as a means of combining the
economic necessity of discipline (and self-discipline) with a moral economy of “fairness”
(Clarke forthcoming b; Clarke and Newman 2012). This separation of the economy – what
Polanyi called its “disembedding” – is the result of political-cultural work, and is pro-
foundly signiﬁcant for how social formations are imagined and acted upon (Grossberg
2010; Peck 2013; Polanyi 1944). What is signiﬁcant is the de-politicizing character of
this discourse of economic necessity: the insistence that economic imperatives (recovery,
growth, competitiveness, etc.) override or even short-circuit political calculation or choice.
For example, Davies argues that the
basic assumption that all action is principally economic action is common to all neoliberal
styles of theory… . This effects a collapse of the separate logics of market, society and
state, using the language and techniques of the former to enact a blanket economic audit of
all three. (2016, 21–22; see also Brown 2015)
Neoliberalism in this sense is both anti-democratic and anti-political, seeking to substitute
an apparently neutral logic of decision-making (market-like in its calculations) for political
contest and debate. In the process, party political competition came to centre on the ques-
tion of economic management: who could be trusted to best manage the economy and its
needs? Dominant voices belonged to central banks, investment brokers, and supranational
organizations – all understood as apolitical – who could simultaneously advise on, judge
and evaluate governmental action.
This knowledge/power nexus was enshrined in the workings of the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF), World Trace Organization (WTO), Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Euro-
pean Union (EU), most visibly in the imposition of austerity policies on so called “debtor”
nations such as Greece. It was also visible in the ways in which national governments –
particularly the Cameron/Osborne regime in the UK – sought to legitimize austerity as a
fundamental priority of governing. This inculcated a particular conception of “realism”
as a disciplinary political and policy device that attempted to control the boundaries of
the “thinkable”. It underpinned the proclaimed “necessity” of particular courses of
action (e.g. public spending cuts, service closures and the rolling back of state-provided
welfare). And it was associated with a particular form of technocratic governance – a
mode of governing that emphases the primacy of “expert” interventions rather than inﬂu-
ence by political parties and the citizens they seek to represent. This conception of
“realism” was not new: for instance, in the UK, Thatcherite conservatism was often
expressed in the TINA claim (There Is No Alternative) while the Blair governments
were noted for their emphasis on “what counts is what works”, an approach that promised
a new science of policymaking that privileged research-based notions of “evidence” and
that instituted a plethora of managerial technologies, audit regimes, action plans and
“expert” templates (see, for example, Cabinet Ofﬁce 1999; Clarke and Newman 1997;
Davies, Nutley, and Smith 2000; Newman 2001).
Critical work has tended to elide such practices into more generalized and generalizing
narratives – of globalization, neo-liberalism and de-politicization. We have some reser-
vations about the totalizing character of such accounts: they tend to underestimate the
amount of political work necessary to de-politicize governing in this way; they tend to a
rather narrow (and established) view of politics and the political, and they tend to a
rather unilinear and epochal view of historical development (Dean 2014; Newman
2017). More particularly, we have been troubled by rather deterministic accounts of the
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relationship between the hegemonic power of economic expertise and the “depoliticiza-
tion” of citizens (e.g. Brown 2015; Crouch 2014; Gill, Johnstone, and Williams 2012;
Wilson and Swyngedouw 2015). The post-2008 restoration of the authority of this knowl-
edge-power complex went alongside, rather than overcoming, considerable popular scep-
ticism about “bankers”: the “fat cats” who caused the crash and walked away from it; the
unregulated or under-regulated “Masters of the Universe” whose hubris wrecked homes,
lives and economies, and (in the UK particularly) the “posh boys” who wove elite net-
works linking the City, commerce and government. Such strands of popular scepticism
formed part of the disaffections that made up what Jeremy Gilbert, writing about the
UK and the rise of UKIP (the anti-EU and anti-immigration United Kingdom Indepen-
dence Party), has called “disaffected consent”:
The very real sense of democratic and political disenfranchisement… ﬁnds expression in one
of two ways: as simple apathy and non-participation; or as organised opposition to UK mem-
bership of the EU and support for the virtual ending of mass immigration. This combination of
policies propelled UKIP into third place in the national vote, and represents a complex set of
implicit and explicit demands, which are not solely motivated by old-fashioned racism, xeno-
phobia and conservative authoritarianism. Hostility to the EU, and to patterns of migration
which appear to transform their communities and localities without any consultation with
them, can also be understood as, in part, expressions of frustration with the lack of meaningful
democratic participation. (2015, 39–40)
Although we would argue that the dynamics of disaffection were more heterogeneous than
this, Gilbert’s analysis speaks powerfully to the profoundly unstable character of the form
of consent that prevailed in the UK before 2016, whose fragility was dramatically exposed
by the Referendum on membership of the EU in June 2016. And, in that moment, expertise
came to be dramatically re-politicised.
Experts, elites and establishments: the populist interruption
Recent political movements broadly described as “populist” have unsettled the established
political order of several European countries and the USA, in the process challenging the
dominance of neoliberal economic expertise. There are, of course, many varieties of popu-
lism: as Samet and Schiller argue, “It is necessary to understand how, and on whose behalf,
‘the people’ – democracy’s vital ﬁction – is constructed, contested and performed” (2017).
Here our main focus is on the summoning of a particular notion of “the people” during the
UK 2016 Referendum on membership of the European Union. In particular, this campaign
represented the people as disdained and disenfranchized by a liberal elite of experts. Those
leading the campaign to remain in the EU put forward powerful “expert” claims about the
damage to the UK economy that would result from Brexit. These were roundly dismissed:
The big guns of the international liberal order were wheeled out to stop us going headlong for
the Puerto Rican option [defaulting on national debt payments, JN&JC]: the IMF, the WTO,
the OECD. Ten Nobel economists added to the din; Obama wagged a ﬁnger; Clinton too. Then
Soros. In reply a forest of ﬁngers was stuck in the air. (Harding 2016)
The Leave movement dismissed “expert” claims as an orchestrated attempt by “the estab-
lishment” to induce fear among “ordinary people”:
“I think people in this country,” declared Vote Leave’s Michael Gove, “have had enough of
experts.” His fellow Brexiteers were quick to back him up. “There is only one expert that
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matters,” said Labour MP Gisela Stuart, also of Vote Leave, “and that’s you, the voter.” Nigel
Farage, the leader of Ukip, suggested that many independent experts were actually in the pay
of the Government or the EU. All three reminded voters of occasions when “the so-called
experts” had made mistakes. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/10/michael-goves-
guide-to-britains-greatest-enemy-the-experts/
The Leave campaign in the UK, and the subsequent Trump presidential campaign in the
US, drew on critiques of expertise as technocratic, de-politicizing and disempowering.
In the process, they sought to establish a very different form of power – one in which
leaders could speak in the name of the people. Particular tendencies were articulated in pol-
itical campaigns that used demotic language – the language of “ordinary people” (Clarke
2010b; Turner 2010) – to distinguish themselves from conventionalized “political speak”.
This demotic style invoked – and claimed to be at one with – “ordinary people” in addres-
sing their anxieties and fears.
While there are many differences between the formations of politics and power in the
UK and US (Grossberg 2018; Watkins 2016), both campaigns drew their success in part
from their capacity to depict “the people” as a singular national entity whose lives had
been damaged by expert elites. Such representations connected the elite, the establishment
and experts as forming an “out of touch” political class who failed to understand, or recog-
nize, the damage done to “ordinary people” by (variously) Europeanization, globalization
and the loss of national sovereignty (on the “establishment”, see, inter alia, Jones 2014;
Van Hollen 2016). The revolt against “expertise” in the moment of Brexit thus refracted
questions of both class (antipathy to ruling elites, the very architects of austerity) and
nation (expertise symbolized “elsewhere”; international institutions, EU bureaucrats and
those seeking to protect global free trade). They also identiﬁed the nation – as the place
where the people live – against the capital, London, as the home of the metropolitan/cos-
mopolitan elite (echoed in Trump’s attacks on “Washington insiders”).
These populist discourses sought to unlock apparently settled conﬁgurations of knowl-
edge and power by offering distinctive representations of expertise. In place of authority
being grounded in scientiﬁc or legitimate knowledge, expertise was reframed as a
symbol of rule, inseparable from the experiences of being ruled. Expertise was thus embo-
died authority – and embodied in the wrong sorts of people: global elites, state institutions,
ﬁnanciers, consultants and so on. It is of course dangerous to read the sayings of Trump,
Farage and other populists as representing the truth of their position: these are, rather, ﬂeet-
ing fragments of political rhetoric that may, or more probably do not, add up to a coherent
view. Nevertheless, such challenges reveal the contingent authority of existing forms of
expertise: their legitimacy is always conditional, always in the process of being claimed,
acceded to, or contested. We think it possible to trace three core discursive themes that
delineate the terrain on which the contemporary struggle over power, knowledge and auth-
ority is being conducted.
First, “expertise” can be made to symbolize very different things – from the objective
and authoritative judgements of the wise, to the overbearing arrogance of out of touch
elites. As a rhetorical device it can thus be mobilized for a range of purposes in and
beyond political campaigns. In the UK, populist politicians targeted judges, politicians
and some media outlets, denouncing them as “enemies of the people” (see, for example,
The Daily Mail, 3 November 2016). The “Leave” campaign castigated members of the
“liberal” and “progressive” elites for being out of touch and for having installed – and ben-
eﬁtted from – a particular form of state power. The disaffected were spoken to, and for,
through language that demonized elite governance, including politicians, judges,
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bankers and welfare professionals. The campaign targeted migrants, liberals and those con-
cerned with “identity politics”: a shorthand for feminists, antiracists, gays, queers, trans-
sexuals and others viewed as threatening the “normal” lives of the “people”. It drew
implicitly on long standing left, feminist and other radical political critiques of expertise
as undemocratic, disempowering, and elitist. Such critiques were appropriated and mobi-
lized to support a new populist project, articulated through a binary between expertise and
the inherent wisdom of the people. In the process, critical aspects of what some have called
an “epistemological populism” were developed (Patten 2017; Saurette and Gunster 2011).
Patten, for example, has agued that key features of this disposition include: the articulation
of an “anti-elitist common sense”, a rejection of the intellectual classes and an insistence on
a libertarian notion of the right to “judge facts for myself”. In a new media ecology that
allows for new forms of political and cultural segmentation, Patten suggests that this strat-
egy divides “the heartland from the rest” and identiﬁes commonsense wisdom as emerging
from the heartland – embodied in “the people”.
Second, then, the conjunctural signiﬁcance of expertise was shaped through a political
practice of establishing a binary distinction between authenticity and expertise. The auth-
enticity of the people is constituted through racialized and nationalized understandings of
who “belongs” and who does not. The “real” people are to be empowered, not through
policy innovations or improvements in the democratic process, but by having a leader
who can voice the “common sense” of the common people, expressing their instinctive
understanding of what is right. Only he (more rarely she), it is claimed, can speak with
the authentic voice of the people, a voice that has been silenced and suppressed by the col-
lusion of “expert power” with political-cultural elites. Those elites shaping state policy, the
media and the wider “liberal culture” are charged with “discriminating” against those
espousing “traditional” moral values that embody the “common sense” of the people.
As Müller argues, “Populists do not just criticise elites; they also claim that they and
only they represent the true people” (2016, 40). But the “true people” are only part of
the people at large, a populist paradox perfectly expressed in Donald Trump’s 2016 state-
ment that “the only important thing is the uniﬁcation of the people – because the other
people don’t mean anything” (cited in Müller 2016, 22). By summoning to power those
that have been neglected, dispossessed, and disadvantaged, populist leaders do not
simply “represent” those silenced voices: they are, rather, constitutive of those they
claim to represent. Here we think it is important to insist on the articulatory work of popu-
list politics: they do not simply speak for, or express, the views of “ordinary people” as
suggested by many commentators (see, for example, Judis 2016). Rather they selectively
articulate, silence and amplify particular popular sentiments, constructing the “common
sense” of the people in the process.
The demonization of expertise as the basis of authority and the antithesis of authen-
ticity is thus at the core of populist rhetoric. This points to our third theme: expertise is
juxtaposed with a moral understanding of politics and judgement in ways that privilege
the latter and present the former as false or corrupt. Müller points to populism as “a
way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully uniﬁed… but ulti-
mately ﬁctional – people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way
morally inferior” (Müller 2016, 20). As such, “the people” is constructed as a moral
rather than thinking actor; the “sense” that is valorized in appeals to the common sense
of the people is one of instinct rather than reason; of trust in the speaker not in an assess-
ment of what is spoken. One feature of this moral register of politics is that it is difﬁcult to
refute through claims of empirical substance: hence Trump’s rejection of counter claims as
“false facts” (neatly turning the use of this phrase by his opponents in the presidential
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election campaign). In addressing the anxieties and fears of the people, populist campaign-
ers represent themselves as truth tellers and taboo-breakers – “telling it like it is” –
especially around questions of immigration, the nation and sovereignty. In this process,
they claim to speak for the “silent majority”: a public that has been silenced by liberal
elites and their overwhelming culture of “political correctness” (see, inter alia, Weigel
2016; the “silent majority” concept goes back to Richard Nixon who claimed them in
1969).
Such populist projects elicit particular temporalities as parts of their preferred “ways of
knowing”. They are shaped at the intersection of images of a discredited past – in which the
people lost their voice, their capacity to speak to power – and a fantasy future in which their
true feelings will be recognized and their desires met. As we saw in the previous section,
most of the expertise deployed in favour of Remain during the 2016 UK Referendum, or
for a so-called “soft” Brexit thereafter, assumed a more or less predictable future in which
consequences could be attached to different courses of action, such that leaving the EU
would have predictably negative impacts on economic growth, ﬁnancial stability, employ-
ment and “the markets”. This was, after all, the model of evidence, analysis and expertise
that has dominated political discourse since the late twentieth century (even if its capacity
to predict problems and crises has appeared recurrently ﬂawed). In contrast, the Leave
movement deployed a different sense of time. Most obviously, it celebrated an imaginary
past when “we” were in control of our country, our borders, our economy and our lives,
captured in the demand to “take back control”. But it also appealed to the past-as-experi-
ence, contrasting the everyday dislocations and disjunctures of economic and social life
with the threatened future projected by the Remain camp (see also Davies 2016, on popu-
lism and the suspension of the future). How could it be worse than it has been? The denun-
ciation of “expertise” at the heart of populism thus challenges forms of probabilistic or
predictive knowledge geared to conceptions of future development or progress:
In rejecting knowledge of the future, Brexitists are saying no to such a politics and the assump-
tions about social change on which it rests. Theirs is an inquisitorial politics which ﬁxes on the
past in order to identify the crimes and betrayals that happened there, to name the guilty parties
and to demand that they be punished. (Finlayson 2017, 22)
Again, these populist challenges carry echoes of left critiques of dominant power/knowl-
edge formations, particularly those that transformed social knowledge into quasi-scientiﬁc
forms, that excluded popular knowledge from expert decision-making or that inscribed
“progress” as both benign and inevitable. The articulation of them into a rightwing nation-
alist project also draws on the undoubtedly unequal impacts of this “progress” (reﬂected in
the impacts of de-industrialization, uneven development, wage stagnation, the degradation
of work and the decimation of public services: see Clarke and Newman 2017 for a longer
discussion). But Finlayson’s argument about the projected “unknowability” of the future
suggests a moralizing divide between the people and their enemies and points to a rearrang-
ing of time and temporalities. The distinctive temporality of populism, in which historical
time is replaced by a continuous and immediate present, is expressed in a promise to efface
“any distance between all desires and their realization” (Taguieff 2007, 16; our translation).
The proposition that “Leave means Leave” or Farage’s celebration of “Independence Day”
carry this sense of time being effaced – the desire to take back control is promised immedi-
ate fulﬁlment. One consequence of this “immediacy” is to generate further contradictions
and antagonisms as political and governmental time (negotiation, planning, policy making,
etc.) come back into play. If contemporary forms of populist politics fed off feelings of
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frustration, anger and a sense of betrayal, then the return of “governmental time” has added
fuel to such feelings and deepened popular scepticism about political elites – and their
“experts”.
Conjunctural conﬁgurations: the instabilities of dominant expertise?
The question of temporality is also at stake in developing a conjunctural understanding of
the Brexit moment and the success of a distinctive populist project (Clarke and Newman
2017). This disaffection from expertise – and its claimed distance from the normative time
of politics – helps to explain how the Leave campaign was able to overcome its most
evident paradox. The triumph of an anti-elite politics that was led by members of that
elite (including leading ﬁgures of the Conservative Party such as Boris Johnson and
Michael Gove) seems perverse: public school educated establishment ﬁgures championing
the “people” against the “elite”, whilst not unknown in the history of populist movements,
was certainly a distinctive feature of the UK’s brush with populism. Their triumph –
however momentary – has led to the disruption in all of the established parties (including
UKIP). Such dislocations of the political stage – and the potential frustrations of govern-
mental time noted above – may make it even harder to ﬁnd new bases for political mobil-
ization among an increasingly disaffected and fractured population.
Avariety of commentators have seen the moment of Brexit, Trump and a revived popu-
list-nationalism as marking epochal shifts – the arrival of an “age of anger” (Mishra 2017)
or an era of populism (Judis 2016). Alternatively, some have argued that this insurgent
populism marks the end of liberalism, neo-liberalism or even “progressive neo-liberalism”
(e.g. Fraser 2017; Gray 2016; Jacques 2016). For instance, Fraser argues that:
… Trump’s victory is not solely a revolt against global ﬁnance. What his voters rejected was
not neoliberalism tout court, but progressive neoliberalism. This may sound to some like an
oxymoron, but it is a real, if perverse, political alignment that holds the key to understanding
the U.S. election results and perhaps some developments elsewhere too. In its U.S. form, pro-
gressive neoliberalism is an alliance of mainstream currents of new social movements (femin-
ism, anti-racism, multiculturalism, and LGBTQ rights), on the one side, and high-end
“symbolic” and service-based business sectors (Wall Street, Silicon Valley, and Hollywood),
on the other. In this alliance, progressive forces are effectively joined with the forces of cog-
nitive capitalism, especially ﬁnancialization. However unwittingly, the former lend their char-
isma to the latter. Ideals like diversity and empowerment, which could in principle serve
different ends, now gloss policies that have devastated manufacturing and what were once
middle-class lives. (Fraser 2017)
There is much to debate in this analysis: the idiosyncratic representation of “progressive
neoliberalism” that draws on Fraser’s long running view of the collusion of the feminism
and other social movements in the making of neoliberalism; the slippage between neoliber-
alism and its “progressive” variant; and the concept of cognitive capitalism (see, for
example, Julia Brenner’s response in Dissent: 2017). However, we want to offer a rather
different view. This must begin from a view of neoliberalism as an articulated ensemble
in which multiple forces are imperfectly aligned. In this ensemble, different rationalities
are able to coexist despite their apparent contradictory imperatives and despite their
diverse political constituencies. And, certainly, any critique of populism as an overwhelm-
ing force must address its interplay with other forces and movements, “borrowing, bending
and blending” (Pennycook 2007, 47) from diverse sources (including left critiques of
expertise as a mode of power). Rather, our problem lies with these “epochal” analyses, con-
ﬁdently announcing the “end of” X or Y. In particular, neoliberalism has been pronounced
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dead on rather too many occasions for anyone to be conﬁdent that it has ﬁnally breathed its
last. As Aditya Chakrabortty noted ironically about an earlier death notice:
Through the autumn of 2008, a steady stream of obituaries ﬂowed into my inbox. They came
from think tanks, from academics and from small publishers of books and journals. All
announced the same death and all were gleeful ‘Neoliberalism is dead!’ they crowed.
Wasn’t it obvious? (2016, ix)
We think it is important to resist the temptations of pronouncing the “death of”, or the “end
of” in such epochal statements. This means refusing to see historical moments in singular
terms (from neoliberalism to post-neoliberalism) or in terms of their singular dynamics,
forces, or causes. We understand the temptations to announce the one “real” cause, but
instead conjunctural analysis asks us to think about how various lines of force intersected
with the fracturing of apparently established governmental and political formations (from
the crises of the European Union to the dis-uniting of the United Kingdom). These multiple
– and heterogeneous – lines of force were recombined in new articulations and found new
voicings that promised to overcome the failures and frustrations, as well as the contradic-
tions and antagonisms, of the existing arrangements. Such a view demands that we think
about multiplicities – of forces, tendencies, antagonisms and contradictions – and about the
instabilities of the emerging formations that are currently in the process of being
constructed.
Elsewhere we have pointed to how the process of reassembling multiple forces into
new formations is political work. Such work involves the practice of articulation, described
by Stuart Hall as marking “the forms of the relationship through which two processes,
which remain distinct – obeying their own conditions of existence – are drawn together
to form a ‘complex unity’” (1977, 48). The work involved is that of decoupling existing
chains of meaning, forging new associations and installing new representations. It relies
on the labour of forging alliances, borrowing vocabularies, and reinventing political pro-
jects, often through appropriating (partially) other political rationalities. The process of
neoliberalization required such work: for example, the articulations with communitarian-
ism (in Blair’s Britain); or Catholic voluntarism (in Northern Italy; see Muehlebach
2012) drew on established formations which gave the neoliberal project a new vitality
and popular reach. In a similar way, we would argue that we need to think of populism,
not as a singular form with a unique character, but as an ensemble or assemblage, elements
of which may be brought into new articulations – with varieties of nationalism, racism, or
white supremacist thinking, for example – to produce newly potent conﬁgurations. Such
work was highly visible during the UK referendum campaign of 2016 and the US election
later that year.
Hall’s concept of a “complex unity” seems indispensable for thinking about the con-
juncture as a whole, and for the particular formations that are active within it. It also pro-
vides a way of returning to the conception of expertise as particular conﬁgurations of
power/knowledge with which we began this article. Thinking of these as articulated
ensembles – of forms and practices of power, of types of knowledge, deploying speciﬁc
sets of tactics, devices and forms of calculation, enacted through particular institutional
apparatuses – makes it possible to see their contingent character. In turn, this enables ana-
lyses of their conditions of existence, their construction and their vulnerabilities. Similar
arguments can be made about the different formations of “populism” that map on to differ-
ent spatialities and temporalities (SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain, Modi in India,
Orbán in Hungary, and Trump in the US). Such contingent conﬁgurations are always
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potentially unstable (as the assembled elements threaten to become unglued) and poten-
tially contestable. This should lead us away from generic or one dimensional views of
either knowledge or power, even when (or perhaps, especially when) the particular
fusion of knowledge and power appears hegemonic or incontestably solid. Such solidity
exists in a dynamic relationship with instability. Gramsci once suggested that “the life
of the state can be conceived as a series of unstable equilibria” (1971, 182), providing a
fruitful image of paradoxical dynamics. We ﬁnd it a productive way of thinking about
states, but think its value extends further – in this case to thinking about forms of expertise
as conﬁgurations of knowledge-power. Certainly, the role of “economic” expertise, central
to the diverse processes of neoliberalization, has shifted from a position of equilibrium,
institutionalized as the necessary and natural knowledge of how economies and their
societies work, to a moment of instability, subject to varieties of scepticism, disaffection
and disenchantment. But what follows or emerges from such instability? What new equi-
libria might be constructed in the re-entangling of power, knowledge and politics?
Emergent articulations: reconﬁguring power, knowledge and politics
Conjunctural analysis requires us to pay attention to the potential lines of development in a
complex historical moment, rather than assuming that there is only one way forward. For
Williams (1977), this meant paying attention to the ﬁeld of possibilities that he character-
ized as made up of dominant, residual and emergent formations (and their interrelations).
For our purposes here, this implies addressing the reconﬁgurations of power, knowledge
and politics that are in play in the present moment, including the emergence of potential
new formations. In this ﬁnal section, then, we sketch some emerging articulations of
knowledge, power and politics. We view these as potential sites in which forms and
uses of expertise are currently being remade, rather than assuming that they have, or
will, become stable conﬁgurations.
We begin by pointing to emergent instabilities in and around the discipline of econ-
omics itself. There has been extensive scepticism about austerity policies on the basis
that there is little or no evidence that austerity works. There have been numerous revolts
against the imposition by the EU of technocratic and depoliticizing expertise on
“debtor” nations, particularly visible in Greece and Spain (e.g. De Witte, Héritier, and
Trechsel 2013; Kowalsky 2015; Varoufakis 2016). The IMF offered a self-critical
account of the failings of its pro-austerity stance (Elliott 2016) and even the Bank of
England admitted that economic forecasting itself might be “in crisis” (Giles 2016). The
orthodoxies of economic expertise on which policy “realism” is based had already been
challenged – for example by feminist economists who offered alternative economic ima-
ginaries and practices (Gibson-Graham 2006; Himmelweit 2013). There have been numer-
ous attempts to challenge economic models that rely on assumptions of permanent growth
(e.g. Raworth 2017). In 2016 protests by economics students at Manchester University
dramatized ﬂaws in the economic models that, they argued, had contributed to the ﬁnancial
crisis of 2008. Their protest widened into a series of student campaigns across ﬁfteen
countries, and into a new network of civil servants exploring alternative approaches to
economic ideas in policymaking. Such instabilities challenge what Earle, Moran, and
Ward-Perkins (2017) term The Econocracy. They may not fundamentally unravel the
knowledge/power knot of economic expertise and its relationship to neoliberal rule, but
they certainly create cracks in its facade of inevitability.
A second potential instability arises from the growing signiﬁcance of emergent clusters
of expertise. Foremost has been the growing interest in the “behavioural sciences” in
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government and the academy as policymakers have sought new practices for managing
populations, for example, by changing the “choice architecture” that inﬂuences human be-
haviour – to reduce smoking, obesity, infant diseases and other social ills, or to promote
recycling, charitable giving and personal health and ﬁtness. The use of such techniques
and technologies been widely critiqued as non-deliberative and individualizing (Jones,
Pykett, and Whitehead 2014; Newman 2013), but they have been at the forefront in the
turn to “digital governance” (Dunleavy 2006); and of innovations in policy and practice,
especially, but not only, in the UK. But the growing signiﬁcance of the behavioural
sciences is also fundamental to new alignments of political power based on the use
social media (Facebook, Twitter etc.) in political campaigning. Investigations by the
Observer newspaper show how companies such as Cambridge Analytica, Strategic Com-
munication Laboratories, and AggregateIQ worked with the Leave campaign in the UK
and the Trump campaign in the US in attempts to inﬂuence voters (Observer Review
26/2/17, Observer 5/3/17). Such reports revealed not only the dense networks that con-
nected companies, campaigns and digital platforms such as Facebook, but also the
extent of inﬂuence by billionaire funders such as Robert Mercer. The claims made about
Cambridge Analytica have been disputed, as have the “neuropretensions” of neuroscience
(Rose and Rose 2016). However, such forms of disciplinary expertise have helped shape a
new consolidation of power, expertise and ﬁnancial capital capable of reaching into the
beliefs, choices and behaviours of citizens. And such forms of power – transnational, net-
worked, secretive, digital – typically tend to elude public scrutiny (Wedel 2009).
The harvesting of personal data is of course not only associated with right-wing move-
ments. The thinktank NESTA argues that the quality of democratic decisions can be
improved by the use of digital platforms to elicit citizen knowledge and transform the
quality of political engagement (Simon et al. 2017). In a similar vein, Noveck (2016)
argues that “big data” affords a means of tapping into distributed expertise in order to
help develop more participative institutions. This focus on the power of “citizen expertise”
looks back to earlier attempts to enhance citizen participation in governing in order to
address the defects of forms of professionalized governance. But rather than seeking
public opinions on speciﬁc policy choices (the tendency of governance-led involvement
initiatives) Noveck advocates the use of crowdsourcing techniques in order to draw on
citizen skills and knowledge. Such developments have echoes in a variety of technologies
for crowdsourcing commercial design (“prosumer” techniques involving users in design
and development) and crowdfunding forms of social and commercial innovation (see,
for example, Ritzer, Dean, and Jurgenson 2012). However, the implications of the
growing interest in “big data” remain ambiguous: it offers tools and technologies that
serve both anti-democratic populist movements and would-be progressive attempts to
democratize governance. There are, however, dangers in viewing these as equivalent.
First, attempts to mine personal data to inﬂuence voting behaviour is concerned with
opinions and values, while crowd-sourcing seeks to elicit a variety of skills and knowledge.
Second, the former seeks to generate mass data while the latter is explicitly focused on
multiplicity and difference. But third, and most importantly for our argument, the
attempt to draw parallels overlooks the dynamics of power that shape these different devel-
opments: the former backed by corporations and ﬁnanced by multi-millionaire backers; the
latter a normative set of ideas on the fringes of government.
We might also trace the emergence of new political forms and forces. In April 2017,
thousands of people joined a “March for Science” to warn against the threat to scientiﬁc
research that the Trump presidency posed. In the UK, numerous pro-EU local activist
groupings have emerged, while investigative and campaigning journalism has ﬂourished,
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albeit from a fragile ﬁnancial base. Failures of ﬂood defenses, food scares and other high
proﬁle tragedies (including the ﬁre in Grenfell Tower, a high rise block of social housing in
London in 2017) have led to calls for a return to regulation and a reassertion of the pro-
fessional skills underpinning it. In the UK and the US we can also trace a reassertion of
judicial power as a means of constraining executive power within government. All point
to the potential reassertion of traditional political ideas and institutions embedded in
law, regulation, and in the multiple organs of statehood. The formerly dominant formations
of policy and politics have not exactly gone away, although their legitimacy has been called
into question. Announcements of the “health of the economy” and promises/threats about
the economic consequences of particular courses of action continue to dominate political
discourse (in claims about the virtues of free trade, protectionism, and nativist imaginings
of work and welfare, for example). And popular scepticism about the role and power of
“experts” (including bankers, economists, politicians, judges, regulators) remains a
potent force. This points to a much more unsettled place for dominant conﬁgurations of
knowledge and power in the present moment as political regimes attempt to create new
equilibria – new settlements – in the face of fractured and fractious publics.
This is by no means an exhaustive survey of dominant, emergent and residual conﬁgur-
ations. Rather our aim has been to suggest that – in this currently unstable landscape – new
articulations of knowledge, power and politics are being elaborated that have potential for
realigning political forces, practices and relationships. Some of these seek to intensify
current concentrations of power, while others seek to loosen or unsettle them. Existing
sites, forms and practices of expertise – and their articulations of knowledge and power
– will not go away easily. What the present moment has made clear, though, is that we
cannot expect that challenges and contestations to them will lead to progressive or libera-
tory outcomes. On the contrary, the nationalist-authoritarian-populist appropriations of cri-
tiques of expertise threaten profoundly regressive recompositions of knowledge, power
and politics.
Conclusion
We have argued for the importance of thinking about expertise through the concepts of
conjuncture and articulation (terms central to the vocabulary of cultural studies). These
concepts point to the contextual speciﬁcity of forms of expertise – their location in particu-
lar formations of space/time – and to the ways in which speciﬁc arrangements of knowl-
edge, power and politics are conﬁgured. Such a perspective illuminates the shifting
fortunes of dominant forms of expertise in recent Euro-Atlantic politics, where populist
movements have made expertise and experts contestable. The process of identifying and
discrediting “experts” as part of the cosmopolitan elite or establishment has undercut
claims to objective or scientiﬁc authority. The process involves the labour of political
actors mobilizing, we have suggested, deep rooted popular scepticism about expertise (par-
ticularly economic expertise) and drawing on previous left critiques of knowledge-as-
power. These insurgent attacks on expertise, elites and the establishment “in the name
of the people” borrow extensively from progressive analyses even while bending them
to other political ends.
This leaves critics with some problems to address. First, can we be more speciﬁc and
careful about our critiques of knowledge/power: are there some forms of expertise that
might be valued, recognized, defended or developed? Our analysis of “emergent” and “tra-
ditional” forms of expertise in the ﬁnal section suggests the need for a more careful decon-
struction of expertise, modes of knowing and forms of authority, rather than assuming that
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“expertise” is always effectively sutured into relations and practices of domination.
Second, it implies thinking more contingently about how knowledge and power are articu-
lated – and their relationship to ﬁelds of political contestation and activation. How might
the “good sense” (rather than the “common sense”) of people be animated and activated
(Crehan 2016)? Third, it implies thinking about conjunctures as heterogeneous – made
up of contradictory, antagonistic and divergent forces and tendencies. As we have
noted, there are a number of forces and movements contesting the “de-politicizing”
effects of dominant conﬁgurations of power/knowledge, creating instead an unsettling
re-politicization. Through such a frame, it becomes possible to see the shifting dynamics
of stabilization and disequilibrium in what Gramsci called the “life of the state” – and in the
formations of knowledge, power and politics in which the life of the state is entangled. In
the end, we believe that attention to the “instabilities of expertise” reveals a terrain that is
more uncertain, more contested and more fractious than conventional approaches would
suggest.
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